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Abstract: Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private 
property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the 
answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in 
private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements 
by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their 
endowments. We report experiment treatments with sequential choice and strategy 
responses. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in 
private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism 
theory [2]. Demonstrable differences and similarities between our strategy response and 
sequential choice data provide insight into the how these protocols can yield different 
results from hypothesis tests even when they are eliciting the same behavioral patterns 
across treatments. 
Keywords: trust game; private property; common property; real effort; revealed  
altruism theory; strategy method; sequential choice 
 
 
  
OPEN ACCESS
Games 2010, 1            
 
 
528
1. Introduction 
Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1], henceforth COW, addressed notions that common property is 
typically over-extracted, neglected, and abused. Predictions of such “tragedies of the commons” are 
often based on reasoning that confounds common property, per se, with open access common  
property [3]. COW reports an experiment with two payoff-equivalent 2-person sequential games: the 
private property trust game and the common property trust game. Both games are designed to measure 
the generosity of the first mover and the cooperative response of the second mover. The games differ 
only in the initial assignment of endowments as private or common property. COW reports no 
significant differences between private property and common property games for either first mover 
generosity or second mover cooperation in using data from a sequential choice experiment on subjects 
with unearned endowments. We investigate whether these results are robust to assigning stronger 
property right entitlements either with sequential choice or strategy responses by second movers. We 
assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real 
effort task to earn their private or common property endowments in our earned endowment treatments. 
This experiment design change reveals some new insights about behavior in private and common 
property environments. We find that a prediction of revealed altruism theory [2], that cooperation will 
be lower in the common property game, is confirmed under stronger property right entitlements, most 
clearly with data from the strategy response treatments. This same pattern in the data is inconsistent 
with all of the purely distributional models of social preferences including the Fehr and Schmidt [4], 
Bolton and Ockenfels [5], Charness and Rabin [6], and Cox and Sadiraj [7] models; for these models, 
the private and common property trust games are isomorphic. 
Section 2 describes the private and common property trust games and the related theoretical 
predictions. Section 3 discusses the COW study design and results. Section 4 discusses the potential 
impact of stronger property right entitlements. Section 5 presents our experiment design with a real 
effort task. Section 6 reports results from our treatments that use the strategy method for eliciting 
second mover decisions. We find that second mover cooperation is lower in the common property 
game than in the private property game. Section 7 addresses the possibility that the results could be 
driven by the strategy method rather than the real effort task. This motivates our use of the sequential 
choice protocol (used in COW) to elicit second mover data in additional treatments. We find similar 
results for second mover behavior with our sequential choice and strategy method treatments. Another 
interesting finding is that first mover choices are different between the strategy method and sequential 
choice treatments (for eliciting second mover responses). In the sequential choice treatment, first 
movers make more choices at the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust” in the common property game 
than in the private property game, as though they anticipate the type of second mover choices that  
we observe.  
2. Theory 
The private property trust (PPT) game and the common property trust (CPT) game are both derived 
from the investment game [8]. In the investment game, there is a first mover and a second mover who 
interact in a one-shot game. Both start with an endowment of $ 10 as their private property. The 
second mover is constrained to keep her $ 10 endowment whereas the first mover can choose to send 
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none, some, or all of her $ 10 (in multiples of $ 1) to the second mover. Each dollar sent by the first 
mover is tripled by the experimenters and added to the private endowment of the second mover. 
Sending money creates a surplus which the second mover must then decide whether or not to share. A 
maximum surplus of $ 20 is generated when the first mover sends his entire endowment of $ 10. The 
second mover can return to the first mover any amount (in whole dollars) less than or equal to the 
amount received. The amount sent by the first mover is traditionally interpreted as a measure of the 
level of trust in the second mover. The amount returned is traditionally interpreted as a measure of the 
level of the second mover’s positive reciprocity. However, Cox [9] showed that first mover and second 
mover actions can be partially motivated by unconditional altruism by using first mover and second 
mover dictator controls for the investment game. Still, we use the traditional label when we refer to 
decisions of “full trust” and “no trust” made in the PPT and CPT games.  
The 2-person PPT game is different from the original investment game [8] in only one way: the 
second mover can return none, some, or all of her $ 10 endowment in addition to the tripled amount 
received from the first mover if she wishes to do so. This change is necessary to make comparisons 
with the CPT game possible because the second mover is not required to withdraw any of the ($ 40) 
common property. The 2-person CPT game is the “inverse” version of the PPT game. In the CPT 
game, $ 40 (the maximum amount that can be generated for subject pairs in the investment game and  
2-person PPT game) is assigned as the amount of common property endowment. The common 
property is described as a “joint decision fund” both subjects can withdraw from. The first mover can 
withdraw up to $ 10, in whole dollar amounts, from the joint fund and place it into his private fund. 
Each dollar withdrawn by the first mover reduces the joint fund by $ 3. The second mover’s decision is 
how to divide the remaining joint fund between her private fund and the paired first mover’s private 
fund after the first mover’s decision.  
The 2-person PPT game and the 2-person CPT game are strategically equivalent (or isomorphic) 
games according to the self-regarding preferences (or “economic man”) special case interpretation of 
game theory. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the same for both games: the second mover 
will return none (allocate none) of his private fund (remaining joint fund) to the first mover, and the 
first mover, expecting this, will send nothing to the second mover (withdraw the maximum of $ 10 
from the joint fund). The investment game, PPT game, and CPT game all have the same subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium for economic man game theory. However, deviations from this prediction 
have been observed in many experiments with the investment game including those reported in [8,9]. 
 New theory has been developed to model social preferences in order to account for deviations from 
the predictions of economic man game theory in many “fairness games” [4–7]. These theories also 
predict that the PPT game and CPT game are isomorphic because they model unconditional 
preferences over the final distribution of payoffs amongst the set of distributions available. A first 
mover who sends an amount  to the second mover in the PPT game or withdraws an amount 10  in 
the CPT game provides the second mover with the same feasible set of ordered pairs of (first mover, 
second mover) money payoffs. Hence models of unconditional other-regarding preferences such  
as [4–7] predict that, for any given number of dollars sent in the PPT game or left (i.e., not withdrawn) 
in the CPT game, a second mover will return or allocate the same amount to the first mover in the PPT 
and CPT games.  
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According to revealed altruism theory [2] these games are not isomorphic. That theory was 
developed to model both unconditional other-regarding preferences and reciprocity. The theory allows 
for individual preferences to include other players’ earnings as well as their own earnings and it 
includes self-regarding (or “economic man”) preferences as a special case. Other-regarding preference 
ordering A is more altruistic than preference ordering B if preferences A exhibit higher willingness 
to pay to increase another’s material payoffs than do preferences B ([2], p. 34). (Preference orderings 
A and B can represent the preferences of two different people or the preferences of the same person in 
two different situations.) Revealed altruism theory also provides a partial ordering of the generosity of 
opportunity sets that the first mover can offer the second mover ([2], p. 36). 
Revealed altruism theory states that an individual’s preferences can become more or less altruistic 
depending on the actions of another agent. Reciprocity, denoted as Axiom R, states that if a first mover 
provides a more generous opportunity set to the second mover then the second mover’s preferences 
will become more altruistic towards the first mover. Data that support Axiom R come from many 
experiments [2,10] including the triadic design experiment with the investment game reported by 
Cox [9]. In that experiment, Treatment A is the investment game and Treatment C takes the 
opportunity sets offered by first movers in Treatment A and randomly allocates them to second 
movers. Second movers in Treatment A know that they received a more generous opportunity set 
because the first mover was generous, whereas dictators in Treatment C know their paired subjects had 
no part in determining their opportunity sets. Support for Axiom R comes from significantly greater 
amounts returned by second movers in Treatment A than in Treatment C after taking into account the 
income effects of more generous opportunity sets [2]. Following evidence from investment game data, 
the similar PPT and CPT games should also follow Axiom R. 
Axiom S is the element of revealed altruism theory that implies that the PPT and CPT games are not 
isomorphic. Axiom S distinguishes between acts of commission, which overturn the status quo, and 
acts of omission which uphold the status quo. The status quo is defined by the opportunity set 
determined by the initial endowments. A first mover upholds the status quo by offering the second 
mover the opportunity set defined by the initial endowment and overturns the status quo by offering 
any other opportunity set. Axiom S states that if the decision made by a first mover overturns the status 
quo then the reciprocal response, for individuals with preferences consistent with Axiom R, will be 
stronger than when the status quo is upheld. 
The collections of opportunity sets that the first mover can offer the second mover are identical in 
the PPT and CPT games but the status quo set determined by the endowments is different. The 
opportunity set determined by the endowments in the PPT game is the least generous opportunity set a 
first mover can offer in the PPT game because it provides the second mover only the opportunity to 
share her own $ 10 private property endowment with the first mover. Each additional dollar that the 
first mover sends to the second mover in the PPT game provides the second mover with a yet more 
generous opportunity set. In contrast, the opportunity set determined by the endowments in the CPT 
game is the most generous opportunity set a first mover can offer in the CPT game because it provides 
the second mover with the opportunity to allocate $ 40 between the two players. Each additional dollar 
that the first mover withdraws from the joint decision fund in the CPT game provides the second 
mover with a yet less generous opportunity set. To uphold the status quo set the first mover must send 
nothing to the second mover in the PPT game and withdraw nothing from the joint fund in the CPT 
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game. A first mover overturns the status quo opportunity set in the PPT game by sending any positive 
amount. A first mover overturns the status quo opportunity set in the CPT game by withdrawing any 
positive amount. 
A second mover with preferences consistent with Axioms R and S will care about how the 
opportunity set actually chosen by the first mover compares to the entire collection of opportunity sets 
the first mover could have chosen and also how the chosen set compares to the status quo opportunity 
set. Second movers will respond more altruistically towards first movers who overturn the status quo 
in the PPT game by sending 1, 2, 3, …, or 10 dollars, respectively, than they do to first movers who 
withdraw 9, 8, 7, …, or 0 dollars, respectively, in the CPT game. Also, second movers will respond 
less altruistically towards first movers who overturn the status quo in the CPT game by withdrawing 1, 
2, 3… or 10 dollars, respectively, than to first movers who send 9, 8, 7… or 0 dollars, respectively, in 
the PPT game. The prediction is that second mover generosity will be lower in the CPT game than in 
the PPT game for any pair of choices in which the first mover sends   in the PPT game and 
withdraws 10   (i.e. leaves ) in the CPT game. 
The null hypothesis SoH  about second mover play is consistent with economic man theory and 
popular models of (unconditional) social preferences [4–7].1  
 
S
oH : For any given number of dollars sent (in the PPT game) or left (in the CPT game), a second 
mover will return or allocate the same amount to the first mover in the PPT and CPT games.  
 
The alternative hypothesis SaH  is consistent with revealed altruism theory [2]. 
 
S
aH : For any given number of dollars sent (in the PPT game) or left (in the CPT game), a second 
mover will return or allocate a larger amount to the first mover in the PPT game than in the  
CPT game. 
 
Revealed altruism theory provides a theory of unconditional other-regarding preferences and a 
theory of reciprocity for second movers. One can, however, use that theory as a basis for conjectures 
about first mover play in the PPT and CPT games. Suppose some first movers anticipate that second 
movers have preferences consistent with a strict preference version of Axiom S. How would this affect 
their decisions? If a first mover is not comfortable with fully trusting the second mover, then he may 
wish to send only part of the endowment of $ 10 in the PPT game (withdraw less than $ 10 in the CPT 
game). Sending an amount less than $ 10 in the PPT game may disappoint the second mover but may 
still make her happy because the status quo was even less generous. Withdrawing any positive amount 
in the CPT game may not only disappoint the second mover but may anger her because the status quo 
determined by the endowments was more generous. At the extreme, in the CPT game the second 
mover may decide to punish the first mover for withdrawing anything by leaving none of the 
                                                 
1 Other papers have developed models of “player types” [11] or “player beliefs” [12, 13]. Given that “type” is a fixed 
characteristic of a player, a model of player types is consistent with SoH  but not 
S
aH . Possible interpretations of player 
beliefs might be consistent with SoH  or with 
S
aH . 
 

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remaining joint fund to the first mover. If Type X players anticipate Type Y play consistent with 
Axioms R and S, then they may withdraw $ 0 if they are ready to fully trust and $ 10 if they are not. If 
the first mover partially trusts the second mover, but is afraid the second mover may also punish her 
for withdrawing, then she may withdraw either the maximum of $ 10 or nothing. These extremes are 
traditionally interpreted as “no trust” and “full trust” although the latent levels of trust by first movers 
may be less extreme (because of the presence of altruism and/or the fear of punishment for partial 
trust). These conjectures suggest hypotheses about first mover play in the PPT and CPT games. 
  
 FoH : The frequency distributions of numbers of dollars sent in the PPT game or left in the CPT 
game by first movers will be the same.  
 
F
aH : First movers will be more likely to choose the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust” in the 
CPT game than in the PPT game.  
3. The Cox, Ostrom, Walker et al. Study 
The COW study supports Axiom R because second movers return (or allocate) more to first movers 
who send more (or withdraw less). But the COW data do not support Axiom S because second mover 
choices are not significantly different between the PPT and CPT games. Hypothesis tests reported in 
COW do not reject the hypothesis that the two games are isomorphic. This finding is consistent with 
the weak preference ordering contained in Axiom S but it does not provide support for a strong 
preference ordering. One of two possibilities can explain their results: (1) subjects have preferences 
consistent with Axiom R but not with a strict preference version of Axiom S; or (2) this particular 
environment and pair of games did not elicit latent preferences consistent with a strict preference 
version of Axiom S. In the spirit of the second explanation we change the environment by adding 
saliency to private and common property ownership. Specifically, we ask if strengthening property 
entitlements will reveal preferences that are consistent with a strict preference version of Axiom S and 
lead to behavioral differences between the private and common property trust games. 
4. Stronger Property Right Entitlements 
In typical experiments, monetary endowments are used as resources or property that subjects use to 
make purchases, transfers, and other decisions. More often than not, monetary endowments are given 
to subjects simply for participating in the experiment. In other words they receive “house money” from 
the experimenter’s research budget and are asked to make decisions with that money. Subjects could 
treat this “house money” differently than if the same money came from their regular income [14]. 
Milton Friedman’s permanent income (PI) hypothesis states that subjects who prefer to smooth 
lifetime consumption will have a lower marginal propensity to consume a one-time gain in 
income [15]. Although some subjects participate in multiple experiments, experiment house money is 
not a regular source of income. Some studies have found that unexpected one-time gains encourage 
risk taking with the new money [16–20]. However, Clark [14] looked for “house money” effects in the 
voluntary-contributions mechanism (VCM) public good game and found none, so the “house money” 
effect is not a robust phenomenon. 
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Why may property right entitlements not be strong enough already? If subjects regard their 
endowments as house money, then they may not care about the distinction between private property 
and common property. If this is true, then property ownership is not salient to the subjects. One way to 
strengthen entitlements and make property ownership salient is to have subjects earn their private or 
common property endowments. 
How might earning endowments create a stronger sense of entitlement? Subjects must bear more 
effort cost in obtaining the property than the usual costs of showing-up and devoting time to the 
experiment, which can foster a stronger attachment to the property. This could motivate subjects’ 
selfish tendencies to ensure they get the most out of the effort they invested in the game. It could also 
strengthen subjects’ preferences for fairness or their risk preferences could change. Once the property 
has been earned all costs to obtain it should be considered sunk costs. Whether or not subjects ignore 
this sunk cost is an empirical question. Daniel Friedman [21] tested to see if subjects commit the sunk 
cost fallacy under a variety of different settings, but surprisingly found very few cases where they did. 
Another convention is to randomly assign subjects to roles with symmetric entitlements. Cherry  
et al. [22] compared decisions made with unearned endowments in a dictator game baseline to a 
treatment with earned endowments. Low-stakes (high-stakes) endowments of $ 10 ($ 40) were earned 
by dictators answering less than 10 (10 or more) questions correctly on a quiz. Non-dictators had $ 0 
endowments and had no opportunity to take the quiz so entitlements were asymmetric. The percentage 
of dictators who transferred $ 0 to the non-dictator increased from 19% (15%) in the low-stakes  
(high-stakes) baseline to 79% (70%) in the earned endowments treatment [22]. Fahr and 
Irlenbusch [23] looked at the effect of the relative strength of property rights between the first mover 
and second mover in the trust game. There were three treatments defined by whether the first mover, 
second mover, or both had to crack walnuts to play the trust game. If required to crack walnuts, 
subjects had to collect 150 g of walnut kernels in about 30 minutes to earn the right to play. They 
found that the second movers were more generous towards first movers when the first movers worked 
and even more generous when the first movers worked and second movers did not work. First mover 
decisions were similar across treatments. Hoffman et al. [24] tested the effects of allowing subjects to 
earn the right of playing first mover in the ultimatum game by scoring high on a general knowledge 
quiz. They found that first movers offered smaller splits to the second movers, who were less likely to 
reject the offers, than in the baseline treatment in which subjects were randomly assigned to the first 
mover and second mover roles. 
Since there is evidence that using earned rather than unearned entitlements to endowments or player 
roles has an effect in games similar to the COW experiment, we ask whether adding stronger private 
and common property entitlements affects behavior differently in the PPT and CPT games. 
Entitlements will be symmetric, and this will be implemented by having all players perform the same 
effort task. 
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5. Experiment Design 
The key design departure of this study from the COW study is the addition of the real effort task. 
This also required a switch from the hand-run procedure in COW to a computer-run experiment to 
save time needed for subjects to perform the real effort task.2 The substantive content of the 
computerized decision forms is identical to that in the COW study. Subject instructions are available 
on the web page of the abstract of the paper. Undergraduate students at Georgia State University were 
recruited by e-mail using the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) recruiter software. The 
experiment was run using a double-blind payoff protocol which prevents the subjects and 
experimenters from being able to personally identify any subject’s decisions and payments.3 After 
signing in, subjects entered the ExCEN computer lab and began reading instructions for the real  
effort task. 
The real effort task was intended to give subjects a stronger sense of entitlement to their private 
property or common property endowment. Subjects had to meet a performance quota to earn their 
endowments, which they were told would be used in the next part of the experiment. Subjects were 
also told in advance that if their quota was not met then they would be paid their show-up fee of $ 5 
and asked to leave the experiment without participating in the decision task. 
Figure 1. Computer screenshot of the real effort task. 
 
 
The real effort task was called the “whack-a-mole game.” Figure 1 shows a typical screen subjects 
would see during the game. There is a 6 by 4 grid of moles and holes on the field. Each time the 
                                                 
2 The computer-run procedure was programmed using the Visual Basic Express 2008 Edition software. 
3 The original investment game experiment reported by Berg et al. [8], as well as the triadic design experiment reported by 
Cox [9] and the COW study [1] underlying the present paper, all used double blind payoffs. This type of payoff protocol 
has also been used in many other fairness game experiments. 
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subject mouse-clicked a mole picture the picture box would show a hole picture. If the subject clicked 
on a hole picture nothing would happen. The object of the game is to mouse-click all of the moles until 
the field is clear of moles (there is only a field of holes). Once a field is cleared the computer generates 
a new field of moles. Each picture box has an equal probability of being a mole picture or a hole 
picture, so fields are half full of moles on average.4 The performance quota required the subject to 
clear a pre-specified number of fields within an announced time limit. Subjects had to meet the quota 
to earn the endowments that were used in the PPT or CPT game. After the time ran out for the  
whack-a-mole game anyone who did not meet the quota was paid $ 5 and asked to leave.5 
Subjects were told that by meeting the performance quota they would earn an endowment to be 
used in the next part of the experiment. The decision task was revealed after the whack-a-mole stage 
was finished. In Treatment CH1, subjects had to clear 120 mole fields in 15 minutes to earn their $ 10 
private endowments for the PPT game. In Treatment CH2, subjects had to clear 120 mole fields in 15 
minutes to earn an endowment that was combined with that of another subject who met the quota and 
placed into a joint decision fund worth $ 40 to be used in the CPT game. Once the subjects who did not 
fulfill the quota left, the remaining subjects were handed instructions for the PPT game or the  
CPT game.  
Treatment CH1 implements the PPT game with the strategy response mode for second movers 
whereas treatment CH2 uses strategy responses in the CPT game. Treatment CH3, CH4, and CH5 use 
sequential responses for first and second movers. Treatment CH3 is a PPT game whereas treatments 
CH4 and CH5 are CPT games. 
For both PPT and CPT games subjects were randomly paired as Type X and Type Y players. After 
reading the instructions and listening to a scripted explanation, each subject chose a sealed envelope 
containing a numbered mailbox key from a box containing identical envelopes. Subjects were told that 
the number on the mailbox key was their private identification number. They were told the numbered 
key would open a numbered mailbox containing their earnings from the decision-making game plus 
their show-up fee of $ 5. Subjects collected their earnings one at a time, in private, and subsequently 
left the laboratory. 
Table 1. Summary of treatments, sample sizes, and subjects’ earnings. 
Treatment Number of Subjects Average $ X Earned Average $ Y Earned 
COW1 (PPT) 68 11.00 20.29 
COW2 (CPT) 68 12.12 20.85 
CH1 (PPT) 64 12.72 18.53 
CH2 (CPT) 62 12.84 21.68 
CH3 (PPT) 56 11.84 17.66 
CH4 (CPT) 64 10.87 18.77 
CH5 (CPT) 64 10.86 18.83 
 
                                                 
4 Each subject faced the same fields in the same sequence because all subjects’ computers started with the same probability 
generating seed. 
5 If only an odd number of subjects met the performance quota, then the subject who was closest to meeting the 
performance quota was allowed to participate in the decision task because that task requires an even number of subjects.  
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Table 1 summarizes all treatments, sample sizes, and average salient payoffs received by subjects. 
(The salient payoff amounts in Table 1 do not include the $ 5 show-up fee.) The numbers of pairs of 
subjects are one-half the numbers in the second column. The treatments were implemented with a 
between-subjects protocol (i.e., no subject participated in more than one treatment).  
6. Strategy Method Protocol Treatments 
The COW study used a sequential move protocol to elicit first mover (Type X) and second mover 
(Type Y) decisions. The difficulty in testing Axiom S using the sequential move protocol is that only 
one Type Y decision is made, and the potential responses to other opportunity sets the Type X player 
could have offered are not observed. Type X decisions could be distributed such that all possible 
decisions are observed frequently or decisions could be clustered. The latter case would make a direct 
test of Axiom S require a very large sample under the sequential move protocol. The strategy method 
protocol offers the benefit of making all potential responses observable. It does this by asking a Type 
Y player to submit a planned response for each possible decision by a Type X player. 
There are some potential problems with using the strategy method protocol. First is the reduction in 
incentives for Type Y players. Type Y players now have to make multiple potentially binding 
responses, yet only one decision determines their payoffs in the end. Their decision-making costs 
increase but their expected rewards do not. There is also a potential “hot” versus “cold” effect. A Type 
Y response in the sequential move protocol is considered “hot” because it is potentially more 
emotional for the Type Y player to learn the Type X player’s decision, and how the decision affects 
their opportunities, before responding. The strategy method protocol is considered “cold” because a 
Type Y subject submits a planned response without knowing the Type X decision beforehand. There is 
mixed evidence on the significance of hot versus cold responses. Three studies do not find a hot versus 
cold effect [25–27] while two studies do find an effect [28,29]. 
Treatments CH1 and CH2 use the strategy method protocol to elicit Type Y responses, which 
requires 11 decisions. After the Type X and Type Y subjects in a pair make their decisions, the actual 
Type X decision makes the associated Type Y response to that decision binding and the game is played 
out to determine the money payoffs to the subjects. Figure 2 shows a screen shot of the Type Y 
player’s decision table for the PPT game with the strategy method protocol. The rows are organized by 
the Type X person’s potential actions in column A, with the first row representing the status quo. A 
subject enters an amount in each row of column C. The decisions can be entered in any order and 
changed at will up until the time the subject clicks on the Submit Decision Table button. The computer 
calculates an amount for a row in column D after a value is entered in that row of column C. The 
decision table for the CPT game is similar except the Type X player withdraws rather than sends so the 
values in column B decrease from (the status quo amount) $ 40 to $ 10. 
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Figure 2. Type Y decision screen for the strategy method protocol. 
 
 
126 undergraduate students from Georgia State University participated in Treatments CH1 and CH2 
in four sessions.6 Treatment CH1 (the PPT game) was conducted in two sessions and, in total, 32 Type 
X subjects sent on average $ 5.63 and 32 Type Y subjects returned on average $ 6.96. Treatment CH2 
(the CPT game) was also conducted in two sessions and, in total, 31 Type X subjects left, on average, 
$ 7.26 and 31 Type Y subjects returned, on average, $ 5.82. These figures are for all strategy responses 
by Type Y subjects. Table A1 in the appendix shows the summary data for Treatments CH1 and CH2 
using realized subject payoffs.7  
Figure 3 compares the distributions of Type X decisions for the two games. For the PPT game there 
are modes at 0, 3, and 10 dollars sent, and the distribution is W-shaped with a fat right tail at 10 dollars 
sent. For the CPT game there are modes at 0, 5, and 10 dollars left, and the distribution is J-shaped 
with more than half of the subjects choosing not to withdraw anything. 
 
                                                 
6 126 subjects attended these sessions. One subject failed to meet the mole quota in the last session for Treatment CH2. The 
subject was allowed to participate because an even number of subjects was needed to generate unique Type X and Type Y 
pairings. 
7 The $ Y Returned and $ Y Earned figures in appendix Table A1 are determined by the single decision for each Type Y 
subject that was selected by the actual Type X subject’s decision. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Type X data for CH1 and CH2. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the results of parametric and nonparametric tests of Type X subject data. The mean 
number of dollars left in the CPT game is greater than the mean number of dollars sent in the PPT 
game and the difference is significant according to the t-test. The distributions of amounts sent by 
Type X subjects in the PPT and CPT games are not significantly different according to the  
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
Table 2. Parametric and nonparametric tests of Type X data for CH1 and CH2. 
 Parametric Test Nonparametric Tests 
Test Means Test  
(t-test) 
Mann-Whitney Test  
(Rank Sum) Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Null Hypothesis CH1 = CH2 CH1 = CH2 Distributions are Equal 
Test Statistic t = –1.7088  
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0924 
Pr(T<t) = 0.0462* 
z = –1.692 
Pr > |z| = 0.0906 
Pr(CH1>CH2) = 0.383 
D = 0.2399 
Exact p-value = 0.256 
*p < 0.05 
  
The most straightforward test of hypothesis FoH  is a two sample proportions test of the distributions 
of Type X responses across the 11 possible choices in the PPT and CPT treatments. This test poses the 
question of whether the differences in empirical frequencies shown in Figure 3 are statistically 
significant. This test is reported in Table A2 in the appendix. There is only one proportion (for amount 
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sent or left equal to 3) that is significantly different between the PPT and CPT data at 5 percent. The 
absence of significance for the proportions at “no trust” and “full trust” means that the data fail to 
reject hypothesis FoH . 
We now turn our attention to second mover (Type Y) data. There are 352 and 341 Type Y decisions 
made in Treatments CH1 and CH2, respectively. Each subject in each treatment makes 11 decisions. 
There is no reason to assume independence of an individual’s decisions. Our data analysis responds to 
this feature of the data in two ways. We report tests based on average responses across subjects to each 
amount that first movers could send. These average responses are independent across the 11 amounts 
that a first mover can send. The other way we analyze the data is with a random effects tobit estimation 
strategy in which an individual subject is a “panel.”  
Averaging the responses across second movers for each amount that can be sent by a first mover 
produces the variables reported in Figure 4 for the PPT and CPT treatments. The Type Y average 
across subjects is higher in the PPT treatment than the CPT treatment for all Type X choices except the 
extremes of 0 and 10. 
Figure 4. Comparison of average Type Y response data for CH1 and CH2. 
 
Table 3 reports results from a t-test and a Wilcoxon test for matched pairs. Both tests yield a highly 
significant difference between second mover responses in the PPT and CPT treatments. The null 
hypothesis SoH  that second movers (Type Y) will return the same amounts in the PPT and CPT games 
is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis SaH  (implied by Axioms R and S) that second movers 
will return more in the PPT game.  
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Table 3. Parametric and nonparametric tests of average Type Y response data for CH1  
and CH2. 
 Parametric Test Nonparametric Test 
Test Means Test  
(t-test, paired data) 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs  
Signed-Rank Test 
Null Hypothesis CH1 = CH2 CH1 - CH2 = 0 
Test Statistic t = 3.85 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0032** 
Pr(T>t) = 0.0016** 
z = 2.578 
Pr > |z| = 0.0099** 
 
**p < 0.01 
This conclusion is also supported by the random effects tobit estimation with individual subject data 
that is reported in Table A3 in the appendix. The coefficient on the amount sent or left by Type X 
players is significantly positive, which provides support for Axiom R. The common property intercept 
and slope dummy variables are both significant, which provides support for Axiom S. The estimated 
parameter for the intercept dummy variable is negative whereas the parameter for the slope variable is 
positive. This is consistent with: (a) second movers’ objection to any change, due to first movers’ 
withdrawals, from the (most generous) feasible set determined by the $ 40 common pool endowment; 
and (b) their willingness to reward first movers’ relative restraint in choosing smaller withdrawals. 
7. Sequential Move Protocol Treatments 
Why does the real effort task provide significant support for Axiom S (i.e., rejection of the null 
hypothesis SoH )? The real effort task may create a stronger sense of entitlement to the endowments. 
When the Type X player withdraws any positive amount in the CPT game she destroys property that is 
not just jointly owned but now the Type Y player may have a stronger sense of entitlement to the joint 
fund. In other words the real effort task may create entitlements which make the property right 
assignments salient enough to bring Axiom S preferences out of latency. 
It is natural for one to ask whether rejection of the null hypothesis can be attributed to use of the 
real effort task or use of the strategy method. Both design changes may affect behavior. The real effort 
task makes property ownership more salient. The strategy method lowers incentives because Type Y 
subjects have to submit 11 decisions instead of one for the same expected payoff. To get more insight 
we conducted sequential move treatments with the real effort task. 
The experiment design and procedures for our sequential move protocol treatments are similar to 
the COW study except there are stronger property right entitlements. In Treatment CH3, subjects had 
to clear 120 mole fields in 15 minutes to play the PPT game. In Treatment CH4, subjects had to clear 
120 mole fields in 15 minutes to play the CPT game. In Treatment CH5, subjects had to clear 240 mole 
fields in 30 minutes to earn the endowment necessary to play the same CPT game played in Treatment 
CH4. Treatment CH5 was conducted to set the mole-whacking effort per dollar of endowment earned 
equal to that in Treatments CH1 and CH3. The potential final earnings are identical in all  
three treatments.  
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184 undergraduate students from Georgia State University participated in Treatments CH3, CH4, 
and CH5 run in seven sessions.8 56 subjects participated in Treatment CH3, the PPT game with a 120 
mole field task. Treatment CH3 generated 28 Type X decisions (an average of $ 4.75 was sent) and 28 
Type Y decisions (an average of $ 6.59 was returned). Treatment CH4, the CPT game with a 120  
mole-field quota, was conducted in three sessions that generated 32 Type X decisions (an average of  
$ 5.28 was sent) and 32 Type Y decisions (an average of $ 6.14 was returned). Treatment CH5, the 
CPT game with a 240 mole-field quota, was conducted in two sessions, which generated 32 Type X 
decisions (an average of $ 4.84 was sent) and 32 Type Y decisions (an average of $ 5.70 was returned). 
Table A4 in the appendix displays the summary statistics for these treatments. 
Differences between Treatment CH4 and Treatment CH5 data are insignificant, so the Treatment 
CH4 and CH5 data are pooled in tests reported in the text. (The appendix tables report separate tests 
for CH4 and CH5 data.) 128 subjects participated in Treatments CH4 and CH5 combined, which 
generated 64 Type X decisions (an average of $ 5.06 was left) and 64 Type Y decisions (an average of 
$ 5.92 was returned). Table A5 in the appendix summarizes the pooled Type X and Type Y decisions 
from Treatments CH4 and CH5, the CPT game. 
Figure 5 displays the distributions of Type X decisions in all three treatments. Treatment CH4, the 
PPT game, has a W-shaped distribution with modes at 0, 4, 5, and 10. Treatments CH4 and CH5, the 
CPT game treatments, both have U-shaped distributions with heavy modes at 0 and 10. Type X 
decisions move to the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust” in the CPT game much more strongly than 
in the PPT game. This result is more pronounced in the sequential move protocol treatments than in the 
strategy method treatment (compare Figures 3 and 5). 
The straightforward test of hypothesis FoH , the two sample proportions test of the distributions of 
Type X responses is reported in Table 4. This test poses the question of whether the differences in 
empirical frequencies shown in Figure 5 are statistically significant. CH3 has significantly lower 
proportions of observations at 0 and 10 than does pooled CH4 and CH5. In addition, CH3 has 
significantly higher proportions of observations at 4, 5, and 6 than does pooled CH4 and CH5. These 
test results support rejection of hypothesis FoH , that the empirical frequency distributions are the same 
for PPT and CPT games, in favor of the alternative hypothesis FaH  that subjects are more likely to 
choose “full trust” and “no trust” in the CPT game than in the PPT game. Table A6 in the appendix 
reports two sample proportions tests for CH4 and CH5 data separately; these tests support  
similar conclusions. 
  
                                                 
8 188 subjects attended these sessions. However 4 subjects were asked to leave because they were unable to meet the mole 
quota in the last session of Treatment CH4. 3 of the 4 subjects could not meet the mole quota because the computer 
software shutdown during the middle of the task for these individuals. Since the subjects faced unusual circumstances, all 4 
subjects were paid $ 15 in private for participation once they left the lab. Two subjects, in different sessions, did not meet 
the mole quota in time for Treatment CH3. These 2 subjects were allowed to play the PPT game because an even number of 
subjects was needed to generate unique Type X and Type Y pairings.  
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Figure 5. Comparison of Type X data for CH3, CH4, and CH5. 
 
Table 4. Proportions tests of Type X data for CH3 and pooled CH4 and CH5. 
Type X sent  
or left 
Treatment CH3 
(PPT) N 
Treatments  
CH4 & CH5 
(CPT)  
N one-sided p-value 
0 0.1786 5 0.390625 25 0.0229* 
1 0.0357 1 0.0000 0 0.0642 
2 0.0357 1 0.0625 4 0.301 
3 0.1071 3 0.03125 2 0.0698 
4 0.1429 4 0.015625 1 0.0066** 
5 0.1429 4 0.03125 2 0.023* 
6 0.1071 3 0.015625 1 0.0238* 
7 0.0357 1 0.0000 0 0.0642 
8 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 … 
9 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 … 
10 0.2143 6 0.453125 29 0.015* 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
Table A7 in the appendix reports additional parametric and non-parametric tests of Type X data. All 
t-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that all treatments have similar mean amounts sent or left. The 
Mann-Whitney and Komolgorov-Smirnov tests imply that no distribution is significantly different 
from another in any treatment comparison.  
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We now turn our attention to second mover (Type Y) data. Averaging the responses across Type Y 
subjects for each amount that can be sent by a Type X subject produces the variables reported in 
Figure 6 for the PPT and CPT treatments. The dashed parts of the piecewise-linear graphs highlight 
parts of the response space for each treatment in which there are no observations because there were 
no Type X choices that could elicit Type Y responses. For example, the dashed segment of the blue 
(CH3) part of the display indicates that no Type X subject sent either $ 8 or $ 9 to a Type Y subject in 
the CH3 treatment. Note that the PPT (Treatment CH3) graph generally lies above the two CPT 
(Treatments CH4 and CH5) graphs and thus reveals a similar pattern to that shown in Figure 4 for the 
strategy method treatments. But the strategy method used in Treatments CH1 and CH2 elicited Type Y 
responses for all possible Type X choices whereas the sequential choice method used in Treatments 
CH3, CH4, and CH5 yields many “missing observations.”  
Figure 6. Comparison of average Type Y response data for CH3, CH4, and CH5. 
 
 
Table 5 reports results from a paired t-test and a Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, with the 
sequential response data, using the same approach used for strategy response data in Table 3. The  
p-value for the paired means t-test is 0.0051 and the p-value for the Wilcoxon matched pairs test is 
0.0277. Similar to the strategy response data, tests of the sequential response data in Table 5 reject SoH
in favor of SaH . Table A8 in the appendix reports the same tests comparing Treatment CH3 to 
Treatments CH4 and CH5 separately; these tests support similar conclusions.  
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Table 5. Parametric and nonparametric tests of avg. Type Y data for CH3 and pooled CH4 and CH5. 
 Parametric Test Nonparametric Test 
Test Means Test  
(t-test, paired data) 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs  
Signed-Rank Test 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = (CH4 & CH5 pooled) CH3 – (CH4 & CH5 pooled) = 0 
Test Statistic t = 2.491 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0674 
Pr(T>t) = 0.0051** 
z = 1.461 
Pr > |z| = 0.0277* 
 
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 
Table A9 in the appendix reports three tobit random effects estimations with Type Y return amounts 
as the dependent variable using data from Treatments CH3, CH4, and CH5. The independent variables 
include the Type X amount sent or left and CPT game intercept and slope dummy variables. The Type 
Y data are consistent with Axiom R as indicated by the “Type X Sent or Left” variable’s statistical 
significance. The data do not support a strict preference version of Axiom S, as indicated by the 
insignificance of both the CPT Intercept and Slope dummy variables. The lack of significance is likely 
coming from differences in the distribution of Type X decisions between the PPT and CPT games. 
Roughly 1/3 of all Type X decisions are to send $ 0 or $ 10 in the PPT game whereas to 2/3 of all Type 
X decisions are to withdraw $ 0 or $ 10 in the CPT game. The modal Type Y response to $ 0 sent ($ 10 
withdrawn) is to return (leave) $ 0. When $ 10 are sent in the PPT game, the average return is $ 16.67 
(standard deviation 8.16), and when $ 0 are withdrawn in the CPT game the average return is $ 12.14 
(standard deviation 8.23). 
Tests of COW data with the same approach used in Table 5 and appendix Table A9 produce 
insignificant differences between the PPT and CPT treatments reported in the COW paper, confirming 
the tests results reported therein. 
Support for both SaH  and 
F
aH  is found in the sequential move protocol treatments. The entitlements 
appear to be not only salient enough to bring Axiom R and S preferences out of latency, but also 
salient enough for Type X players to anticipate these preferences and respond accordingly by choosing 
the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust.” 
8. Conclusion 
We used a real effort task in which subjects had to meet a performance quota to earn the right to 
play in the private property trust (PPT) game or the common property trust (CPT) game. This was 
done to give the subjects a stronger sense of entitlement to their private or common property 
endowments and increase the saliency of property rights. We employ the strategy method in 
Treatments CH1 and CH2 in order to elicit the reciprocal second mover choice implications of first 
mover choices less frequently observed in the sequential move protocol. The strategy method protocol 
asks second movers to submit a planned response to each possible Type X choice. The strategy method 
treatments reveal that second movers allocate less to first movers in the CPT game than in the PPT 
game. This finding supports Axiom S from revealed altruism theory [2] and is inconsistent with the 
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isomorphism of the PPT and CPT games implied by unconditional social preferences and economic 
man theories. 
Treatments CH3, CH4, and CH5 employ the sequential move protocol. Type Y data from these 
treatments are consistent with data from the strategy method treatments. Support for Axiom S comes 
from paired t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests but not from tobit estimations. Display of data 
from the two types of (strategy and sequential) treatments in Figures 4 and 6 suggests that the primary 
reason for the lower significance of the PPT vs. CPT treatment effect with the tobit estimation of 
sequential move protocol data can be attributed to “missing observations” relative to the strategy 
method protocol.  
One notable finding is that first movers choose the extremes of “no trust” and “full trust” 
significantly more in the CPT game than in the PPT game for the sequential move protocol treatments. 
This did not occur for the strategy method protocol treatments. One possible explanation is related to 
the debated “hot” versus “cold” effect: perhaps first movers are more likely to anticipate and/or are 
more wary of “hot” responses (predicted for sequential responses) than “cold” responses (predicted for 
strategy responses) to their withdrawal of tokens in the CPT game. First mover expectations were not 
elicited, so this remains a conjecture. 
Our data support the conclusion that the PPT and CPT games are not isomorphic under stronger 
property right entitlements. We find evidence of Type Y preferences that support Axiom S, which 
provides some insights into the differences in the need for trust and cooperation between private 
property environments and common property environments. We also provide further evidence that 
having subjects earn their endowments can be an important experimental design consideration in 
testing theory. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary data for strategy method treatments CH1 and CH2. 
Treatment CH1: Private Property Trust Game (Mole Quota = 120) 
N-Pairs=32 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dollars X Sent 5.63 3.94 0 10 
$ Y Returned 8.34 7.25 0 20 
$ X Earned 12.72 5.49 0 20 
$ Y Earned 18.53 8.87 0 40 
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Table A1. Cont. 
Treatment CH2: Common Property Trust Game (Mole Quota = 120) 
N-Pairs =31 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dollars X Left 7.26 3.64 0 10 
$ Y Returned 10.10 8.62 0 25 
$ X Earned 12.84 6.49 0 21 
$ Y Earned 21.68 7.56 10 40 
Table A2. Proportions tests of Type X data for strategy method treatments CH1 and CH2. 
Type X sent  
or left 
Treatment CH1 
(PPT) N 
Treatment CH2 
(CPT) N 
one-sided  
p-value 
0 0.1875 6 0.1290323 4 0.2627 
1 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 … 
2 0.03125 1 0.0000 0 0.1606 
3 0.15625 5 0.0322581 1 0.0469* 
4 0.0625 2 0.0645161 2 0.4869 
5 0.125 4 0.0967742 3 0.3608 
6 0.0000 0 0.0322581 1 0.1529 
7 0.03125 1 0.0645161 2 0.2677 
8 0.03125 1 0.0000 0 0.1606 
9 0.0000 0 0.0322581 1 0.1529 
10 0.375 12 0.5483871 17 0.0837 
*p < 0.05 
 
Table A3. Random effects tobit estimation with Type Y data for Treatments CH1 and CH2. 
Number of Obs. 693 
Number of Groups (Individuals) 63 
Constant Term –2.674 
(.055) 
Type X Sent or Left 1.607 
(.000)*** 
Common Property Intercept Dummy –4.49 
 (.026)* 
Common Property Slope Dummy 0.302 
(.003)** 
Sigma_u 7.440 
(.0000)*** 
Sigma_e 3.561 
(.0000)*** 
Rho .814 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Table A4. Summary data for sequential move protocol Treatments CH3, CH4, and CH5. 
Treatment CH3: Private Property Trust Game (Mole Quota = 120) 
 N-Pairs = 28 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
$ X Sent 4.75 3.45 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.59 7.43 0 20 
$ X Earned 11.84 5.36 0 20 
$ Y Earned 17.66 6.86 10 40 
Treatment CH4: Common Property Trust Game (Mole Quota = 120) 
N-Pairs = 32 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
$ X Left 5.28 4.70 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.14 7.85 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.87 5.86 0 20 
$ Y Earned 18.77 10.53 0 40 
Treatment CH5: Common Property Trust Game (Mole Quota = 240) 
N-Pairs = 32 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
$ X Left 4.84 4.78 0 10 
$ Y Returned 5.70 8.35 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.86 5.99 0 20 
$ Y Earned 18.83 10.27 0 40 
Table A5. Treatments CH4 and CH5 pooled common property trust game data. 
N-Pairs = 64 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
$ X Left 5.06 4.71 0 10 
$ Y Returned 5.92 8.04 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.86 5.88 0 20 
$ Y Earned 18.80 10.32 0 40 
Table A6. Proportions tests of Type X data for CH3 and (non-pooled) CH4 and CH5. 
Type X sent  
or left 
Treatment 
 CH3 
(PPT) 
N 
Treatment  
CH4  
(CPT)  
N 
one- 
sided 
p-value 
Treatment  
CH5 
(CPT)  
N 
one- 
sided 
p-value 
0 0.1786 5 0.34375 11 0.0744 0.4375 14 0.0157* 
1 0.0357 1 0.0000 0 0.1405 0.0000 0 0.1405 
2 0.0357 1 0.125 4 0.1059 0.0000 0 0.1405 
3 0.1071 3 0.0000 0 0.0287* 0.0625 2 0.2663 
4 0.1429 4 0.0000 0 0.0134* 0.03125 1 0.0593 
5 0.1429 4 0.03125 1 0.0593 0.03125 1 0.4617 
6 0.1071 3 0.03125 1 0.1199 0.0000 0 0.0287* 
7 0.0357 1 0.0000 0 0.1405 0.0000 0 0.1405 
8 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 … 0.0000 0 … 
9 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 … 0.0000 0 … 
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Table A6. Cont. 
Type X sent  
or left 
Treatment 
 CH3 
(PPT) 
N 
Treatment  
CH4  
(CPT)  
N 
one- 
sided 
p-value 
Treatment  
CH5 
(CPT)  
N 
one- 
sided 
p-value 
10 0.2143 6 0.46875 15 0.0196* 0.4375 14 0.0336* 
*p < 0.05 
Table A7. Parametric and non-Parametric tests of Type X data for CH3, CH4, and CH5. 
Parametric Test Nonparametric Tests 
Test Means Test (t-test) Mann-Whitney Test 
(Rank Sum) Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = CH4 CH3 = CH4 Distributions are Equal 
Test Statistic t = –0.5031 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6168 
Pr(T<t) = 0.3084 
z = –0.245 
Pr > |z| = 0.8065 
Pr(CH3>CH4) = 0.482 
D = 0.2545 
Exact p-value = 0.240 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = CH5 CH3 = CH5 Distributions are Equal 
Test Statistic t = –0.0878 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9303 
Pr(T<t) = 0.4652 
z = 0.277 
Pr > |z| = 0.7821 
Pr(CH3>CH5) = 0.520 
D = 0.2589 
Exact p-value = 0.224 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = CH4 & CH5 CH3 = CH4 & CH5 Distributions are Equal 
Test Statistic t = -0.3559 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7230 
Pr(T<t) = 0.3615 
z = 0.018 
Pr > |z| = 0.9858 
Pr(CH3>CH4 & CH5) = 
0.501 
D = 0.2388 
Exact p-value = 0.181 
Null Hypothesis CH4 = CH5 CH4 = CH5 Distributions are Equal 
Test Statistic t = 0.3692 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7132 
Pr(T>t) = 0.3566 
z = 0.460 
Pr > |z| = 0.6459 
Pr(CH4>CH5) = 0.531 
D = 0.938 
Exact p-value = 0.999 
Table A8. Parametric and nonparametric tests of avg. Type Y data for CH3, CH4, and CH5. 
 Parametric Test Nonparametric Test 
Test Means Test  
(t-test, paired data) 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Rank Test 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = CH4 CH3 – CH4 = 0 
Test Statistic t = 2.491 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0674 
Pr(T>t) = 0.0337* 
z = 1.761 
Pr > |z| = 0.0782 
 
Null Hypothesis CH3 = CH5 CH3 – CH5 = 0 
Test Statistic t = 2.8957 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0443 
Pr(T>t) = 0.0222* 
z = 1.069 
Pr > |z| = 0.0796 
 
*p < 0.05  
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Table A9. Random effects tobit estimations with Type Y data for Treatments CH3,  
CH4, CH5. 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Data Set Treatments CH3, 
CH4, and CH5 
Treatments 
CH3 and CH4  
Treatments  
CH3 and CH5 
Number of Obs 
Number of Groups (Individuals) 
92 
92 
60 
60 
60 
60 
Constant –7.217 
(.033) 
–6.812 
(.032) 
–6.898 
(.033) 
Type X Sent or Left 2.335 
(.000)*** 
2.291 
(.000)*** 
2.301 
(.000 )*** 
CPT Intercept Dummy –1.845 
(.662) 
–0.157 
(.970) 
–4.330 
(.354) 
CPT Slope Dummy –0.258 
(.672) 
–0.495 
(.423) 
–0.010 
(.987) 
240 Mole Field-Quota –0.927 
(.0707) 
… … 
Sigma_u 6.32e–09 
(1.000) 
9.42e–09 
(1.000) 
6.93e–10 
(1.000) 
Sigma_e 8.33 
(.000)*** 
7.758 
(.000)*** 
7.879 
(.000)*** 
Rho 5.75e–19 1.48e–08 2.28e–08 
***p < 0.001 
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